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Abstract
Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications
ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions
of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.
These games are generally very difficult to solve even when one player’s strategy
is fixed, and so constructing and evaluating good sub-optimal policies for each
player is an important practical problem. In this paper, we propose the use of
information relaxations to construct dual lower and upper bounds on the optimal
value of the game. We note that the information relaxation approach, which has
been developed and applied successfully to many large-scale dynamic program-
ming problems, applies immediately to zero-sum game problems. We provide
some simple numerical examples and identify interesting issues and complica-
tions that arise in the context of zero-sum games.
1 Introduction
Zero-sum games (hereafter ZSG’s) have played a central role in the development of game theory
with seminal contributions from Borel [1], von Neumann [2] and Shapley [3]. The latter consid-
ered discounted dynamic ZSG’s and identified conditions under which they have a unique equilib-
rium value while Patek and Bertsekas [4] extended these results to more general stochastic shortest
path (SSP) games. ZSG’s have many applications including pursuit-evasion / hunter-prey problems,
heads-up poker and many so-called parlor games. Many other important problems, however, can be
also modeled as ZSG’s. These problems generally have an adversarial feature and applications can
be found in many fields ranging from business to cyber-security and disease control. In addition,
risk-averse control problems can also be cast as ZSG’s by assuming that nature plays an adversarial
role and selects probability distributions, payoffs or some other feature with a view to thwarting
the decision-maker. This is a common approach in the multi-armed bandit1 literature, for example,
where the goal is to tradeoff the benefits of exploitation and exploration.
While standard dynamic programming (DP) methods such as value and policy iteration have been
adapted to solve ZSG’s, these methods quickly become computationally intractable as the game
size grows. Indeed many important games of interest are too large to be solved exactly and require
approximate solution approaches. Texas hold’em heads-up poker, for example, is a popular game
and only very recently has the “limit” version of this game been effectively solved; see Bowling et
al. [6] as well as Sandholm [7] for an overview of approaches to tackling incomplete information
ZSG’s. Many DP problems are also intractable and this of course has led to the development of
the approximate DP literature. Adversarial versions of these problems will clearly then also be
intractable.
1See Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [5] for an overview.
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It is therefore important that we be able to construct good sub-optimal policy pairs (one for each
player) for large-scale ZSG’s. It is generally straightforward to simulate a policy pair and therefore
obtain an unbiased estimate for the game value of this pair. But how far is this value from the
(optimal) game value? While we can’t answer this question unless we can solve for the game
value itself, we can obtain bounds. In particular, if we fix one player’s strategy we can then solve
for the other player’s best response and the resulting value will be a bound2 on the game value.
Unfortunately, solving for the best response is a DP problem that will itself often be intractable.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how tight bounds on these best-response problems can be
found so that we can still obtain lower and upper bounds on the optimal game value. We do this via
the recently developed information relaxation approach to obtaining dual bounds for DP problems.
Moreover, strong duality (see part (c) of Prop. 1) tells us that if we start off with a policy pair that
is close to optimal, then it should be possible to obtain tight lower and upper bounds on the optimal
game value. Such bounds would then “certify” just how good the sub-optimal policy pair is.
The information relaxation approach was introduced independently by Brown, Smith and Sun [8]
(hereafter BSS) and Rogers [9] who in turn were partly motivated by earlier work [10, 11] on the
pricing of high-dimensional American options. Over the past several years there have been many
successful applications of this methodology; see for example [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
This paper was also motivated in part by Beveridge and Joshi [21] who used the aforementioned
work on American options to compute dual bounds for zero-sum optimal stopping games. This
paper explains how dual bounds can be computed for general ZSG’s as long as these games have an
optimal value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We formulate the ZSG problem and review
the results of Shapley [3] in Section 2 and then review the information relaxation approach for
constructing dual bounds in Section 3. We provide two examples in Section 4: a simple 2-period
matrix game and an industrial-waste inspection game. We briefly discuss some specific issues and
challenges that arise in the context of ZSG’s in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Dynamic zero-sum games
We now provide a brief overview of ZSG’s and we mainly use the same notation and simplifying
assumptions (finite action sets and state spaces, common information, simultaneous moves etc.) of
Section 7.2 of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [22]. We note, however, that there is no problem relaxing
these assumptions. We essentially only require that the ZSG has a value in order to apply the
information relaxation approach to compute dual bounds.
There are two players: we refer to player A as the maximizer and player B as the minimizer. At
each time t and in each state i, A and B choose actions u and v from finite constraint sets, U(i) and
V (i), respectively. Transition probabilities are of the form pij(u, v) and one-stage costs are given
by g(i, u, v, j). The players use randomized strategies to select u and v in each period. In particular,
in state i player A chooses a probability distribution y = {yu |u ∈ U(i)} over the set U(i) while B
chooses a probability distribution z = {zv | v ∈ V (i)}. The system therefore moves from state i to
state j with probability ∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
yuzvpij(u, v)
and the stage cost is
G(i, y, z) =
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
yuzv
n∑
j=1
pij(u, v)g(i, u, v, j).
A policy piA = {µ0, µ1, . . .} for player A is a sequence of functions, µk, so that A selects his time
k, state i action via the probability distribution, µk(i) which is defined over U(i). Similarly we use
piB = {ν0, ν1, . . .} to denote a policy for player B. Stationary policies have the form {µ, µ, . . .} and
{ν, ν, . . .} and we simply refer to them as µ and ν, respectively. The cost-to-go for policies piA and
2Depending on which player’s strategy is fixed, the bound will be a lower or upper bound on the game value.
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piB starting from state i is
JpiA,piB (i) =
∞∑
k=1
αkE [G(ik, µk(ik), νk(ik)) | i0 = i]
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. We use Jµ,ν(i) to denote the cost-to-go corresponding to
the pair of stationary policies (µ, ν). We can then define the min-max and max-min costs as
J(i) = min
piB
max
piA
JpiA,piB (i)
J¯(i) = max
piA
min
piB
JpiA,piB (i).
We note that J(i) and J¯(i) are the optimal game values corresponding to the different orders in
which A and B must choose their policies. The question then arises as to whether J(i) and J¯(i) are
equal in which case we could define this common value to be the equilibrium value of the game. The
key result of Shapley [3] is that this is indeed the case. In particular, there exists a pair of stationary
policies (µ∗, ν∗) such that
Jµ
∗,ν∗(i) = max
µ
Jµ,ν
∗
(i) = min
ν
Jµ
∗,ν(i) = J(i) = J¯(i) =: J∗(i) (1)
where we use J∗(i) to denote the equilibrium value of the game. Given (1) it is not surprising that
the various solution approaches to dynamic programming problems, e.g. value iteration and policy
iteration, have natural analogs for ZSG’s. Details are given in [22] and for more general stochastic-
shortest path games in [4]. Since finite horizon games can formulated as infinite horizon games by
including time t as a state variable, Shapley’s result also applies to these games resulting in optimal
policies that are now time-dependent.
2.1 Computing bounds on the game value
Let (µˆ, νˆ) be any pair of stationary policies. Then it follows immediately from (1) that
J µˆ(i) ≤ J∗(i) ≤ J νˆ(i)
where J µˆ(i) is B’s best response to µˆ and J νˆ(i) is A’s best response to νˆ. In theory both J µˆ(i) and
J νˆ(i) can be found using standard DP methods such as value or policy iteration. For large scale
games, however, computing J µˆ(i) and J νˆ(i) (as well as J∗(i)) may be intractable. For games of
practical interest, this is often the case and so the best we can hope to do is to find good policies,
(µˆ, νˆ), and bounds on J µˆ(i) and J νˆ(i). In particular, we would like to find a good lower bound,
J µˆlow(i), for J
µˆ(i) and a good upper bound, J νˆup(i), for J
νˆ(i). In that case we will have
J µˆlow(i) ≤ J µˆ(i) ≤ J∗(i) ≤ J νˆ(i) ≤ J νˆup(i) (2)
and it follows that [J µˆlow(i), J
νˆ
up(i)] is an interval containing the true value of the game, J
∗(i). We
note that finding a good lower bound for J µˆ(i) is not straightforward since J µˆ(i) is the solution of
a DP where the goal is to minimize costs. Any feasible policy for this DP therefore yields an upper
bound for J µˆ(i) so that the inequality goes in the wrong direction. A similar observation applies to
finding an upper bound for J νˆ(i). In the next section we describe how the desired bounds, J µˆlow(i)
and J νˆup(i), can be computed using the concept of information relaxations and dual penalties.
3 Information relaxations for dynamic programming problems
The information relaxation approach was developed independently by BSS [8] and Rogers [9] but
the former is more general and we follow3 their approach here. In particular we will consider a DP
problem where the objective is to minimize total expected costs. This is the primal DP problem
and it is exactly this problem4 that we face in trying to obtain a lower bound on J µˆ(i) as described
3Our overview of BSS follows Brown and Haugh [19].
4By considering a DP problem where the goal is to maximize total expected gains we can use the information
relaxation approach developed in this section to obtain an upper bound on J νˆ(i). The approach is identical so
we will consider only the construction of the dual lower bound here.
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above. In order to keep the notation manageable, however, we will drop all references to µˆ as well
as any reference to the players. We will begin with finite horizon problems after which we will
describe how infinite horizon problems can be handled. It will also be convenient to introduce some
alternative notation to that developed in Section 2. In particular, we will now use x ∈ X to denote a
generic state and we will assume a state transition function
xt+1 = s(xt, vt, wt+1) (3)
where xt is the time t state, vt is the action chosen at time t and wt+1 is a random variable. Without
loss of generality we can take the wt’s to be IID U(0, 1) random5 variables.
The information relaxation approach considers policies that use more information than is available
to primal feasible policies. Specifically, we consider policies that can use advance information about
realizations of the uncertain sequence, {wt}t≥1; such policies are generally not feasible to the primal
DP. By finding the best such policies, we can obtain lower bounds on the optimal value of the primal
DP. To make this idea concrete, we let F denote the underlying filtration associated with {wt}t≥1,
i.e., F := {Ft}t≥0, where Ft denotes the σ-algebra generated by (w1, . . . , wt) at time t. We will
describe additional information structures via another filtrationG := {Gt}. We sayG is a relaxation
of F if Ft ⊆ Gt for all t, i.e., under G, at least as much (and perhaps more) is known about {wt}t≥1
at all times t. We let EGt denote expectations conditional on Gt. We will refer to realizations of{wt}t≥1 as scenarios or dual paths. A policy is adapted to a filtration F (or F-adapted) if the actions
taken by the policy in every period t are measurable with respect to Ft. We let UF denote the set of
feasible, F-adapted policies. If G is a relaxation of F, then UF ⊆ UG: a policy that is F-adapted is
also G-adapted.
Given a finite horizon, T , the expected time t = 0 cost for any ν ∈ UF can be written as
Jν0 (x0) = E
[∑T−1
t=0
Gt(xt, νt(xt))
]
.
We let Jt(xt) denote the optimal cost at time t from state xt and we also define v := (v0, . . . , vT−1)
and w := (w1, . . . , wT ). BSS then consider penalty functions z(v,w) :=
∑T−1
t=0 zt(v,w) that
depend on actions and uncertainties. They call a penalty function z dual feasible if E[z(ν)] ≤ 0 for
all ν ∈ UF. The following result recaps some of the main results from BSS.
Proposition 1 (BSS 2010) Let G be any information relaxation of F.
(a) Weak duality: For any dual feasible penalty z,
J0(x0) ≥ inf
ν∈UG
E
[∑T−1
t=0
Gt(xt, νt(xt)) + zt(ν)
]
. (4)
(b) Dual feasible penalties: Let h1, . . . , hT be any sequence of measurable functions ht :
X → R. Then the penalty given by zt(v,w) = E[ht+1(st+1(xt, vt, wt+1))] −
EGt [ht+1(st+1(xt, vt, wt+1))] is dual feasible.
(c) Strong duality: When ht = Jt, inequality (4) holds with equality.
Part (a) of Prop. 1 shows that we can get lower bounds with any information relaxation and any
dual feasible penalty. For example, when G is the perfect information (PI) relaxation where the
entire scenario w is revealed at t = 0, we can simply simulate scenarios and select actions “path-
wise” that minimize the sum of costs plus penalties. The expected value of the optimal costs (plus
penalties) then provides a lower bound on the optimal value V0(x0). More specifically, assuming
a PI relaxation we can compute an unbiased lower bound on J0(x0) by simulating N scenarios,
wn = (wn1 , . . . , w
n
T ) for n = 1, . . . , N , and then solving for
J
(n)
0 := infv0,...,vT−1
∑T−1
t=0
Gt(xt, vt) + zt(v,w
n). (5)
5To connect with the formulation of Section 2, we can take wt to be the random variable that is used to
generate the state transition in accordance with pxt,xt+1(µˆ(xt), vt) where we are keeping player A’s policy
fixed at µˆ. While these probabilities depend on the action, vt, we can still take the wt’s to be IID and have the
state dependence handled via the transition function, s.
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where the xt’s satisfy (3) withw
(n)
t replacingwt. (With a PI relaxation the “inf” in (4) can be moved
inside the expectation which then yields a “dual” or ”inner” problem of the form (5).) An unbiased
lower bound for J0 is then given by
∑N
n=1 J
(n)
0 /N .
Part (b) of Prop. 1 is useful because it provides a method for constructing dual feasible penalties: we
can obtain a dual feasible penalty by adding up differences in conditional expectations of a sequence
of any “generating functions” h1, . . . , hT . Finally, part (c) of Prop. 1 shows that this approach, in
theory, provides tight bounds: by taking the generating functions to be the optimal cost functions, the
optimal value from the relaxed problem equals the optimal cost of the primal DP. Of course, when
applying the method, we would typically not know Jt, but we can take the generating functions
to be approximate value functions, Jˆt, and, by parts (a) and (b) of Prop. 1, we will nonetheless
obtain a lower bound on the optimal cost. Moreover, the closer Jˆt is to Jt the better we expect the
lower bound to be. As mentioned in Section 1, there have now been many successful applications
of this methodology in the DP literature. We note that BSS also showed that for any given penalty,
zt(v,w), information relaxations of F that reveal less information yield tighter dual bounds.
Infinite horizon problems
As stated earlier, Shapley [3] solved the infinite horizon discounted ZSG problem (which includes
the finite-horizon ZSG as a special case). While the information relaxation approach was originally
developed for finite horizon DP’s, Brown and Haugh [19] show how it can easily be extended to
infinite horizon discounted problems. The industrial-waste inspection game below, however, is not
an infinite horizon discounted ZSG but is instead a stochastic-shortest path (SSP) ZSG. An SSP ZSG
is a non-discounted infinite horizon game that has a terminal absorbing state that may or may not
be reached in a finite number of time periods. The theory of such games is more delicate and was
treated6 by Patek and Bertsekas [4].
One potential difficulty that arises in constructing dual bounds for SSP ZSG’s is in simulating a
dual sample path, (w1, . . . , wT ). The absorption time, T , is random and policy-dependent and so
it’s not clear how to simulate such a path. The weak-form approach of Rogers [9] and Brown and
Haugh [19] show how this problem can7 be resolved. In particular, dual sample paths are simulated
under a reference transition probability measure, Q, that is action-independent. We can use such a
Q to generate dual sample paths as long as all such paths terminate after a finite number of periods
Q-almost surely. Appropriate Radon-Nikodym terms are then used to adjust the objective function
in (5) to account for this change of measure. It is also necessary to ensure certain absolute-continuity
conditions are either satisfied or handled appropriately. Space constraints prevent us from expanding
further on these issues but see [19] for further details.
4 Some Examples
We now consider two examples where we use the information relaxation methodology to construct
dual bounds on the optimal game values. These are simply illustrative examples so in each case we
were in fact able to solve for both the best responses, maxµ Jµ,νˆ(i) and minν J µˆ,ν(i), as well as
the optimal game value. The dual bounds were constructed in each case using the value function,
J µˆ,νˆ(i), corresponding to some fixed policy pair (µˆ, νˆ), to construct dual feasible penalties. We do
note, however, that approximate value functions can be constructed in many different ways and that
it may be advantageous to use different approximate value functions (and indeed different transition
measures, Q) to construct the dual penalties required for each of the two dual bounds.
4.1 A dynamic matrix game
We first consider a single-period two-person ZSG where the payoff is defined by an m × n matrix,
R. In this game players A and B simultaneously select a row, u, and a column, v, respectively, after
which B pays A the value Ru,v . A mixed policy, y, for player A is an m × 1 vector such that A
6In his thesis Patek [23] considered the industrial-waste game and showed that it has an optimal game value
7Brown and Haugh [19] identify other approaches such as their truncated horizon or quasi-strong-form
approaches that can often yield superior bounds.
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Table 1: Optimal policies and game values
t xt u
∗
t v
∗
t Jt(xt)
0 1 [0.5 0.5]′ [0.75 0.25]′ 5
1 2 [0 1]′ [1 0]′ 10
1 3 [1 0]′ [0 1]′ −10
chooses the u-th row with probability yu. Similarly, we let z denote player B’s mixed policy. The
expected payoff to A is then y′Rz.
Consider now a 2-period dynamic game defined by the following three matrix games:
R(1) =
[
2 1
6 8
]
R(2) =
[
8 15
10 12
]
R(3) =
[−8 −10
3 −11
]
.
The state variable xt ∈ {i | i = 1, 2, 3} determines the game R(xt) that is played at time t, and
G(xt, ut, vt) is then the payoff of that game when A and B choose the utht row and v
th
t column,
respectively. The game begins at t = 0 with A and B playing R(1) so the initial state is x0 = 1.
The game to be played at t = 1 is determined by A and B’s actions and a transition probability,
pxt,xt+1(ut, vt). These transition probabilities are determined by the (ut, vt) element in the matrices
Pxt,xt+1 which are defined as:
P1,2 =
[
0.7 0.55
0.4 0.5
]
and P1,3 =
[
0.3 0.45
0.6 0.5
]
.
For example, if A chooses the second row and B chooses the first column when playing R(1) at time
0, then B pays A 6 units and at time t = 1 they will play game R(2) with probability 0.4 and game
R(3) with probability 0.6. The optimal policies and value functions for this 2-period ZSG are easily
calculated using standard techniques and are given in Table 1.
We can compute an upper bound for the fair value of the game, J0(1), by fixing B’s policy, νˆ, and
then solving for A’s best response. If we take νˆ = {νˆ0(x0 = 1) = [0.6 0.4]′, νˆ1 = v∗1(x1)}, then
the solution to A’s best response DP problem is given by:
J νˆ1 (x1) = J1(x1) (6)
J νˆ0 (x0) = max
u∈1,2
{
R νˆ0 =
[
4.4
5.6
]}
= 5.6 (7)
where
R := R(1) + J1(2)P1,2 + J1(3)P1,3 =
[
6 2
4 8
]
.
We note that 5.6 = J νˆ0 (x0) is of course an upper bound on the value of game, J0(x0) = 5. For more
complex games we would not be able to compute J νˆ0 (x0) but we can instead use the information
relaxation approach to compute an upper bound, J νˆup(x0), on J
νˆ
0 (x0). Suppose we use a PI relax-
ation and construct the penalty zˆ = Jˆ νˆ1 (x1)−E
[
Jˆ νˆ1 (x1)
∣∣F0] where Jˆ νˆ1 (x1) is an approximate value
function for player A’s DP. For illustrative8 purposes, we take Jˆ1(x1; vˆ) = 8 ·1{x1=2}−8 ·1{x1=3}.
We estimated the dual bound by simulating 10,000 values of w1, solving the deterministic dual inner
problem (5) for each value, and then averaging the results. This yielded an estimated upper bound
J νˆup(x0; zˆ(νˆ)) = 5.82 with a standard error of 0.02.
As an aside, we note that if we instead used the dual optimal penalty z∗ = J νˆ1 (x1)−E
[
J νˆ1 (x1)
∣∣F0],
each dual inner problem (5) yields an upper bound J νˆup(x0; z
∗(νˆ)) = 5.6, thereby demonstrating
strong duality (for B’s fixed policy, νˆ) as defined by part (c) of Prop. 1. Note also that if we
fixed B’s policy at the optimal ν∗ and repeated the numerical calculations above, then we would
obtain J0(x0) = Jν
∗
0 (x0) = J
ν∗
up (x0; z
∗(ν∗)) = 5. Corresponding lower bounds for J0(x0) can be
obtained analogously by fixing A’s policy and solving or lower bounding player B’s resulting DP.
8This is the game value at time t = 1 if A always chooses first row and B always chooses first column when
playing R(x1).
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4.2 An industrial-waste inspection game
We now consider a somewhat more practical game as discussed in Patek [23]. The two players are
a manufacturer (player A) who produces industrial waste that must be dumped every night, and an
inspector (player B) who wants to catch the manufacturer dumping. There is a finite number of
geographically disparate sites where industrial waste can be dumped. A must dump waste at one of
these sites every night while avoiding detection by B. In order to detect dumping activity on a given
night, B must inspect the same site where A is dumping that night and even then, there is a nonzero
probability of failing to catch A. In particular, conditional on A and B selecting the same site, the
probability of detection depends upon two considerations:
1. The closer the current dumping site is to the preceding dumping site, the greater the prob-
ability of detection. (This models the environment’s limited ability to absorb waste.)
2. The closer the current inspection site is to the preceding inspection site, the greater the
probability of detection. (This models the fact that the inspector needs less time to travel
and so he has more time to look for dumping activity.)
If B detects A dumping two nights in a row, then A is put out of business. A’s objective is to maximize
its time in business, while B’s objective is to minimize A’s time in business. In deciding where to
dump / inspect each night, we assume that both players know where the dumping and inspection
occurred on the previous night. They also know whether or not A was caught dumping the previous
night. Patek [23] shows that this game has an optimal equilibrium value.
We can formulate this as a zero-sum SSP game as follows. LetL = {l1, ..., lN} represent theN sites
where waste may be dumped. We let ut−1 ∈ L denote the site where A dumped at time t−1 and we
let vt−1 ∈ L denote the site inspected by B at that time. Let ct be a Boolean variable which is TRUE
if A was caught dumping at time t − 1. The state vector xt = (ut−1, vt−1, ct) then describes the
state of the system at time t. There are9 N2 + N possible non-absorbing states and one absorbing
state. Given the manufacturer A has not yet been shut down at time t, A chooses to dump at site
ut ∈ A(xt) = L and B chooses to search at site bt ∈ B(xt) = L. The probability that A will then
be detected on night t is
pd(xt, ut, vt) =
{
p¯d +
pd−p¯d
(k1+k2)d¯
[k1d(ut, ut−1) + k2d(vt, vt−1)], if ut = vt
0, otherwise
(8)
where d(li, lj) denotes the distance between sites li and lj , d¯ = maxli,lj∈L d(li, lj) is the max
distance between any two sites, 0 < pd < p¯d < 1 are worst-case and ideal probabilities of detection,
and k1 and k2 are positive weighs. If ct = FALSE, then the system transitions to state (ut, vt,TRUE)
with probability pd(xt, ut, vt), otherwise the system transitions to (ut, vt,FALSE). If ct = TRUE,
then the game transitions to the absorbing terminal state with probability pd(xt, ut, vt), otherwise
the system transitions to (ut, vt,FALSE). The cost is 1 in each time period regardless of the controls
applied10.
We consider a case with N = 10 sites that are located on a straight line with equal distances
between successive sites and where d(li, lj) = |j − i|. We assume parameter values of pd =
0.5, p¯d = 0.95, k1 = 2 and k2 = 1. We begin with suboptimal policies, (µ0, ν0), where A
and B select sites uniformly each night and we compute the game value, J (µ
0,ν0)(x0), for these
policies. We then use the so-called naive policy iteration algorithm (see [23] and [24]) to update
these policies. We use (µk, νk) to denote the policies resulting from k rounds of policy iterations
and the corresponding game values are denoted by J (µ
k,νk)(x0). After each policy iteration, we
also computed each player’s best response to the other player’s strategy. For more complex games
in general, these best responses cannot be calculated and so we therefore also computed dual bounds
9Note that states (ut−1, vt−1, ct = 1) are not possible unless ut−1 = vt−1. Hence there are 2N2−N(N−
1) = N2 +N possible states.
10Any pure policy for the inspector B is improper in this game because, knowing this policy, the manufacturer
A can always avoid being detected. On the other hand, a mixed policy which select each site with a positive
probability will eventually result in A getting caught, so there exists a proper policy. See Patek [23] for more
on proper policies for SSP ZSG’s.
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to these best response value functions. The dual bounds were computed using dual feasible penalties
constructed according to part (b) of Prop. 1 with h(xt) taken equal to J (µ
k,νk)(xt).
The results are displayed11 in Figure 1 for the initial state (l1, l1,FALSE) and were computed using
the weak-form dual approach of Rogers [9] and Brown and Haugh [19]. We used a Q that was
action-independent and that moved from any state (except the absorbing state) to any other state
with equal probability, i.e. with probability 1/(N2 + N). The terminal state was naturally also Q-
absorbing. Note that the dual bounds become very tight after just two rounds of policy iteration. This
of course is consistent with strong duality, i.e. part (c) of Prop. 1, which suggests that dual penalties
constructed from better approximations to the value function should yield tighter dual bounds.
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Figure 1: Dual bounds, best responses and game values for waste-inspection game
5 Adversarial games and games with imperfect information
There are several interesting features of the information relaxation approach that are even more
pronounced for ZSG’s. We briefly discuss some of these features now. Many of the most interesting
ZSG’s are imperfect information games where one or both players have private information. The
best response of each player is then a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). It is
well known (see [25]) that these problems can be converted into DP problems and so these games
fit into our framework. That said, there is considerably more flexibility regarding the choice of
information relaxation, G, and we can expect this flexibility to greatly influence the tractability of
the dual inner problems. Moreover, there is no reason to require that the dual lower and upper
bounds are constructed using the same set of simulated paths, penalties, control variates (to reduce
Monte-Carlo uncertainty) or transition measures, Q. Indeed, depending on the form of transition
measures used to generate dual inner problems, it may be necessary to use different penalties for the
dual lower and upper bounds.
We also note that adversarial versions of control problems can be considerably harder to handle.
For example, Brown and Haugh [19] use Lagrangian relaxation methods to construct dual penalties
and therefore obtain tight dual bounds for an intractable multiclass queuing problem. This approach
might not work, however, for most adversarial versions of this problem where nature gets to choose
the (presumably) state-dependent arrival rates. This introduces new challenges in finding suitable
approximate value functions / dual penalties for these problems.
6 Conclusions
We have shown how the information relaxation approach for DP problems can be applied to in-
tractable ZSG’s where the best response DP problems are also intractable. This is an active area
of research within the DP literature with many interesting questions still to be addressed and new
challenges that arise in the context of large-scale ZSG’s.
11We did not plot the results for k = 0 since in that case the bounds were very far apart – the dual lower and
upper bounds were 128.8 and 365.5, respectively – and would disrupt the scale of the plot.
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